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Abstract
We compare two approaches to measuring UK top income shares—the share of income going to particular
subgroups, such as the top 1%. We set out four criteria that an ideal top share series should satisfy: (i) compara-
bility between numerator and denominator; (ii) comparability over time; (iii) international comparability; and (iv)
practical sustainability. Our preferred approach meets three of these; by contrast the approach currently used to
produce UK fiscal income series meets none of them. Changing to our preferred approach matters quantitatively:
the share of income going to the top 1% is 2 percentage points higher, but rising more slowly, than under the
alternative.
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Top income shares – the amount of income held by some fraction of the population, say the top 1%, divided by total
income in the population – provide an important insight into the unequal distribution of resources. As well as being
a matter of increasing public concern in itself, the share of income captured by the top is also used by economists to
understand the dynamics of entrepreneurship, innovation, growth and other macroeconomic outcomes (Gabaix et al.,
2016; Jones and Kim, 2018; Aghion et al., 2019). Early work by Atkinson (2005b), later extended to produce the UK
top share series in the widely-cited World Inequality Database (WID), illustrated how such income inequality in the
UK has developed over time. Top shares declined dramatically throughout the 20th Century until the 1980s, rising
again to levels seen immediately after the Second World War by the turn of the century. The measured rise in top
income shares was halted by the Financial Crisis, though it appears that lately the rise in inequality has resumed.
A serious treatment of measurement issues has long been a hallmark of work on inequality and measures of top
income shares (Atkinson, 2005b, 2007; Piketty and Saez, 2003, 2020; Auten and Splinter, 2019). Much of the focus
has been on accurate quantification of the incomes of the richest. These are poorly measured in survey data, through
a combination of lower response rates by the rich and weaker coverage of the types of income sources received by
the rich (Burkhauser et al., 2018a,b; Advani et al., 2021). This has motivated the use of administrative data to
replace or augment survey responses, but recent work has pointed to limitations even of administratively measured
top incomes. For example, such data miss the effects of both tax evasion (Johns and Slemrod, 2010; Alstadsæter
et al., 2019; DeBacker et al., 2020), and tax avoidance, where incomes are shifted into deferrable or non-taxable
remuneration (Alstadsæter et al., 2016; Smith et al., 2019; Advani and Summers, 2020).
Separate to this, but equally important, is the issue of what measure of income one wants to use in principle,
when thinking about measuring living standards. This issue is addressed in a parallel strand of literature (Haig, 1921;
Simons, 1938; Armour et al., 2014; Larrimore et al., forthcoming a; Corlett et al., 2020). We adopt fiscal income –
defined as all forms of income assessable for income tax – as our target definition. This is the longest running and
most widely used measure of incomes in the UK, as well as being the starting point for other more comprehensive
definitions, though it clearly excludes many welfare relevant sources of remuneration including capital gains (Advani
and Summers, 2020).
While significant advances have been made in measurement of income held by the richest – the numerator in
calculations of the top income share – relatively little attention has been paid to the denominator. This is largely
because, in principle, it should be straightforward to measure: once we have a target definition of income, and a way
to measure it among top individuals, the same approach can be extended to the rest of the population, creating an
‘internal’ denominator. However, top incomes are best measured in administrative tax data. These exclude very low
income individuals who fall below the minimum threshold required to pay tax, known in the UK as the ‘personal
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allowance’. Historically, that threshold was relatively low, so the small amount of total income going to people
with income below the threshold was ignored Atkinson (2005b, 2007). However, the ‘personal allowance’ has risen
substantially, tripling over the past 20 years, so that an increasing amount of income would be missed by excluding
this population. In 2016-17, 39% of adults had incomes below the personal allowance, covering 8% of total income.
At the same time there have been substantial efforts to harmonise measures of inequality across countries (Atkinson,
2005a, 2007; Alvaredo et al., 2013, 2016, 2020; Garbinti et al., 2018; Piketty et al., 2018). To create international
standardisation of the denominator and avoid concerns about the rising personal allowance, since 2009 the fiscal
income series of WID has instead used an ‘external’ denominator series for the UK, based on taking components
from the aggregate National Accounts (Atkinson, 2012; Alvaredo, 2017). This paper revisits the wisdom of that
choice, with the benefit of hindsight and increased data availability.
We compare the merits of using an ‘augmented internal’ denominator – using survey data to augment the admin-
istrative tax data – to an external denominator based on National Accounts. Our augmented internal approach sums
the fiscal income assessed by tax authorities, obtained from tax data, and adds to this an estimate of total income
among the non-taxpaying population using survey data. Our alternative external denominator uses information from
the National Accounts, retaining components of national income which have a counterpart in fiscal income.
To establish a preference for one methodological approach over another, we define a set of principles that an
ideal top share series ought to satisfy, regardless of the income definition being targeted. The four criteria we set
out are: (i) comparability between the numerator and denominator; (ii) comparability over time; (iii) international
comparability; and (iv) practical sustainability. Judging our two fiscal income series against these criteria, we argue
that while our augmented internal approach satisfies all but the third criterion, the external approach to constructing
a denominator for the fiscal income series satisfies none.
Using our preferred augmented internal approach, we provide an updated series for UK top shares which will
replace the current WID fiscal income series from October 2021. Our main finding is that denominator choice is
quantitatively important: the share of the top 1% rises by 2pp when an augmented internal income total is used
relative to an external total. Along with this higher level, our denominator implies a slightly flatter trend in top
shares in recent years relative to the previous fiscal income series in WID. We find that the top 1% share of pre-tax
income rose from 12.2% in 1996-97 to 15.2% in 2007-08. Top shares fell in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis, and
have risen slightly in recent years, with the top 1% receiving 14.1% of pre-tax fiscal income in 2016-17.
Our approach to selecting between top income series also makes a wider methodological contribution, by providing
a principled way to think about the options. The use of National Accounts to construct income control totals for
estimating top shares dates back to Kuznets (1953), and has been widely adopted since (Piketty, 2003; Piketty and
Saez, 2003). Work by (Atkinson, 2005b, 2007) highlighted the possibility of instead using an internal denominator,
which would be more consistent with the numerator, and this approach was subsequently adopted for the UK.
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Later this decision was reversed in favour of an internationally comparable denominator (Atkinson, 2012; Alvaredo,
2017), and more recently delays in producing the series have partly been driven by a need to reconcile the growing
gap between the two approaches, as also highlighted by Burkhauser et al. (2018b). By setting out first some clear
desiderata against which the alternatives can be compared, we are able to provide a clear rationale for which series
should be preferred and why it is superior. These principles can continue to be applied as data availability evolves
in the UK, as well as to decisions about denominator choice in other countries’ estimates of top shares.
The top income share series and methodological justification we provide complements the recent development
of Distributional National Accounts, which builds on existing fiscal income series to obtain a more comprehensive,
and internationally comparable, perspective on inequality (Alvaredo et al., 2016; Piketty et al., 2018; Garbinti et al.,
2018; Piketty et al., 2019). Our work will also have broader implications for the literature on UK income inequality,
as many studies take external income control totals (often from WID) as given when constructing inequality statistics
(Burkhauser et al., 2018b; Jenkins, 2017; Atkinson and Jenkins, 2019).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the data sources. Section 3 describes
the methodology used to construct our numerator. Section 4 describes the two approaches we use to construct the
denominator. Section 5 sets out the four desirable criteria we believe a top share series ought to possess and outlines
our reasons for preferring the series using our augmented internal denominator to one using an external denominator.
Section 6 presents our updated series for top pre-tax and post-tax income shares in the UK. Section 7 concludes.
2 Data
Our target measure of income inequality is the share of fiscal income that goes to particular top shares of the
population, for example the top 1%. Fiscal income is defined as income that is taxable under the personal income
tax system within a country. It is the most commonly used and longest standing definition of income for measuring
inequality in practice, both in the UK and internationally, because it can be accurately measured in tax data.
It is worth noting that, although readily measurable, fiscal income does not comprehensively capture all sources
of income that we might think of as important for determining living standards. Notably, it misses non-taxable
income from certain types of investment and state benefit. It also misses income not subject to income tax such
as capital gains, even though in practice the dividing line between capital gains and labour income is often blurred
(Corlett et al., 2020). There is also a wider question, when measuring inequality in society, about who should be
considered: tax data only capture individuals who are resident in the UK for tax purposes, but there may be others
who spend significant time in the UK and are seen as contributing to a sense of rich and poor.
Despite these limitations, there are important reasons for ensuring that fiscal income shares are measured ac-
curately. First, it is a long-standing and well-used series (Piketty, 2003; Piketty and Saez, 2003; Atkinson, 2005b,
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2007). Second, work that seeks to incorporate particular kinds of ‘missing incomes’ begin from fiscal income series
(Alstadsæter et al., 2019; Advani and Summers, 2020). This includes recent methodological developments such as
Distributional National Accounts (DINA) (Piketty et al., 2018, 2019). Finally, this is the measure of income that
makes up the tax base i.e. that income tax seeks to redistribute, and so is crucial for debates about policy even where
it isn’t the most accurate measure of income from a welfare standpoint.
2.1 Survey of Personal Incomes
To construct our the numerator for all our top income share series as well as parts of the ‘augmented internal’ income
control total (i.e. denominator), we draw on microdata captured in the Survey of Personal Incomes (SPI) Public
Use Tapes, released annually by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC). The SPI consists of a sample of
administrative tax records drawn from the universe of UK income taxpayers, covering the years 1996-97 to 2016-17.
The sample consists of 482,000 individuals on average over the period. The data contain information on all income
assessable for Income Tax. For individuals with incomes exceeding the tax exemption threshold (the standard PAYE
personal allowance, set at £12,500 in 2020), the SPI “provides the most comprehensive and accurate official source
of data on personal incomes” (HMRC, 2019). For this reason, we use the SPI as our main source of information on
incomes above the personal allowance.
We include individuals with incomes above the personal allowance even if they do not pay income tax. Such
individuals are captured in the SPI if their total fiscal income exceeds the personal allowance, but they have no tax
liability after deductions and reliefs are taken into account. Were we to omit these individuals from our sample,
their incomes would be missing altogether from the resulting income total. This represents a point of departure from
the previous WID methodology which drew on tabulations of SPI data covering the taxpaying population. As some
of the non-taxpaying population are high earners, it is possible that omitting non-taxpayers affects the WID fiscal
income numerator in top income shares, as well as the denominator.
The key SPI variable used to compute the total income of those earning above the personal allowance is total
income (TI). However, we modify this definition slightly to account for the way in which dividends are recorded
in the SPI. Specifically, an adjustment is applied to the dividends component of total income to account for the
notional tax credit which was available on dividends from shares in UK (and some foreign) companies until 2016-17.
Until 1999, a 20% tax credit represented the tax already paid on profits made by UK companies under Advanced
Corporation Tax (ACT). In 1999, ACT was abolished, but the (now notional) tax credit remained in place at a 10%
rate, before being abolished altogether in 2016-17. Until 2016-17, dividends in the SPI have been grossed up by the
dividend tax credit amount, though this tax credit amount does not represent any dividends actually received by
individuals. To avoid creating an arbitrary discontinuity in 2016-17, we retrospectively remove the notional dividend
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credit as far back as 1999-00 by reducing the SPI dividend variable by 10%.
To construct a measure of post-tax income, we deduct income tax liabilities and National Insurance contributions
from our SPI pre-tax income variables. For income tax liabilities, we deduct the actual tax liability as recorded in the
SPI. For National Insurance contributions, we estimate individual liabilities by applying the relevant NICs schedule
in a given year to the relevant income-source variables in the SPI. This differs from the previous WID methodology,
which deducted Income Tax liabilities but not National Insurance Contributions. National Insurance Contributions
are functionally equivalent to a tax, and deducting them provides a more realistic measure of individual post-tax
income.
2.2 Family Resources Survey
Tax data do not comprehensively capture individuals with incomes below the personal allowance. This presents
a growing challenge to the construction of top income shares, which require a good estimate of the total personal
income in the economy. Increases in the personal allowance over time – from £3,765 in 1996-97 to £11,000 in 2017-
17 – have resulted in a decline in the proportion of the population with income above the threshold: from 68%
in 2007-08 to 59% in 2016-17. Moreover, as the personal allowance has increased, so has the average income of
each individual below the threshold. This means that income totals based only on the taxpaying population miss a
growing proportion of total personal income. Though the SPI does capture a significant number of individuals with
income below the personal allowance, HMRC note that “the SPI is not a representative data source for this part
of the population” (HMRC, 2019). To capture income below the tax threshold, we supplement our tax data with
information drawn from the Family Resources Survey (FRS) Public Use Files, an annual cross-sectional survey of
British households containing on average 42,000 individuals per year over the sample period. In principle, the FRS is
representative of the whole population. In practice, however, there is known under-coverage at the top of the income
distribution (Burkhauser et al., 2018a,b; Jenkins, 2017). The SPI is a more reliable data source for top incomes,
hence its use both in the current paper and as a supplement to survey data in the aforementioned literature.
Fiscal income is not directly measured in the FRS. However, the Public Use Files contain cleaned and weeklyised
income receipts from different sources at an individual level, enabling us to construct a measure of fiscal income
which corresponds closely to the tax code. We include all individuals with fiscal income below the standard personal
allowance in our sample, regardless of whether they are likely to pay income tax or not (some individuals may pay
tax if they are not entitled to the standard personal allowance). We thus use the standard personal allowance as
the nominal cutoff for joining our SPI and FRS samples. In Figure A1 we show, for a plausible range of joining
thresholds, that this choice makes little difference to the income control total.
When using survey data, a common concern is that totals may be biased due to under-coverage and/or under-
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reporting. This is a particular issue for investment income, which is poorly captured in the FRS (Ooms, 2019;
Advani et al., 2021). Since individuals with incomes below the personal allowance are likely to receive a minority
of total investment income, this issue will have only a small impact on our estimates. A greater concern for our
purposes is the known under-reporting of benefit income in the FRS (Corlett et al., 2018). Corlett et al. (2018)
find a £37 billion gap between benefit receipts reported in the FRS and the amount reportedly paid out by the
UK government. Significant gaps in taxable benefit totals, including the State Pension and Employment Support
Allowance, raise the concern that we may miss a substantial proportion of benefit income – which is concentrated
at the bottom of the distribution – by relying only upon the FRS. To address this issue, we obtain administrative
totals for benefit expenditure from the UK government’s Benefit Expenditure and Caseload Tables (Spring 2020),
which are released with each budget. For benefits recorded in the SPI/FRS that can be directly compared to what
is recorded in the expenditure tables, we adjust the total obtained from the SPI/FRS combined measure to match
the administrative total. We discuss this further in Section 4.1.
As we are using the standard personal allowance as the joining threshold for the two datasets, we expect that
the majority of the taxpaying population will be captured in the SPI sample. Individuals with incomes below the
standard personal allowance, but who nevertheless pay tax (e.g. because the standard personal allowance does not
apply to them) should be represented in the FRS sample of individuals with earnings below the personal allowance.
We do not attempt to calculate the tax liability of these individuals when constructing our post-tax series. We do,
however, deduct National Insurance contributions, estimating these in the same way as for individuals in the SPI.
The threshold for National Insurance contributions has been lower than the income tax threshold in recent years and
this gap is growing, meaning that a growing proportion of our FRS sample are required to make National Insurance
contributions.
2.3 National Accounts
We construct our alternative, external income control total using data from the UK National Accounts. We use
information contained in the ‘Households’ sector account of the most recent Blue Book publication (2019), which
includes disaggregated components of household sector income as far back as 1987. The National Accounts are
published on a calendar year basis. To convert our estimates to fiscal years (as the SPI, and hence our numerator,
is published on this basis), we take 3/4 of the total for the earlier calendar year and 1/4 of the total for the later
calendar year. This approximates the UK tax year, which runs from the 6th April to the following 5th April.
The definitions used to construct the income components in the National Accounts do not necessarily correspond
to our target fiscal income definition. In Section 4.2, we discuss this in detail and show that it is a key disadvantage
of the external denominator approach. A second related issue is that the National Accounts lack the detailed
7
disaggregation of income components necessary to adjust the income definition in line with changes in the tax code
over time. Relying on the National Accounts to construct a fiscal income series comes at the cost of having to
accept National Accounts income definitions – which may change over time – and the uncertainty over how well
these correspond to fiscal income. Our findings below suggest that even income components as ‘simple’ to measure
as employment income give substantially different totals in the National Accounts relative to our augmented internal
measure.
2.4 Population
We use the same population control (i.e. total population) as used previously for the UK in the World Inequality
Database, namely the number of adults aged 15 and over, taken from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) mid-
year population estimates (Table A1). The World Inequality Database now favours using a 20+ population control
total for most countries. However, the age bins provided in the tax data are insufficiently granular to make this
possible: we cannot exclude individuals aged less than 20 from the data, instead the next bin starts at age 25. This
means that, were we to use a 20+ population control to define the population size of the numerator, our top shares
would likely be downward biased. We discuss this in more detail in Appendix B.1. The choice of population control
is non-trivial, as our SPI/FRS sample suffers from population under-coverage, particularly in the 1990s and early
2000s. We discuss this issue further in Section 3.
3 Numerator
To construct the numerator of our fiscal income series, we use microdata on individual incomes from the SPI.
Individuals are ranked according to their total pre/post-tax fiscal income. Aggregate income of the top X% is
estimated as the total income of the top N (weighted) individuals, where N represents X% of our population control
total. This differs from the approach previously used to construct WID top income shares, which applied Pareto
interpolation methods to tabulations of SPI data (Atkinson, 2005b).
The magnitude of the numerator depends on the choice of population control, as our combined SPI/FRS sample
suffers from population under-coverage particularly in the early years of our sample, with around 9% of individuals
missing in 1997-2003. A priori, it is unclear how this impacts top share estimates. If the SPI/FRS sample captures
100% of individuals in the top X% and misses individuals located further down the income distribution, which prior
research suggests could be likely (Britton et al., 2019), our top shares will be overstated when we use our ‘external’
population control – based on ONS figures. On the other hand, if population under-coverage occurs at the top
of the distribution, then whether or not top shares are over- or under-stated depends on the shape of the income
distribution. In Appendix B.2 we discuss this issue further and illustrate how top shares differ when an internal
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population control – taken from the count of individuals in the grossed up data – is used instead. Importantly, the
issue of population under-coverage affects top shares regardless of whether a bottom-up or top-down denominator is
used. In this paper, we use the same numerator for all pre-tax top shares. Any differences in the results across series
are therefore driven by the choice of denominator.
4 Denominator
The income control total is the denominator in a calculation of the top income share. It can be obtained in one
of two ways. First, it can be derived by starting from tax microdata, and supplementing this with an estimate of
total income for the non-taxpaying population—an ‘augmented internal’ control total. Second, it can be constructed
by starting from the National Accounts, and retaining only the income components of the household sector which
correspond as closely as possible to the fiscal income definition—an ‘external’ control total.
4.1 Internal Control Total: SPI
In its most basic form, the internal income control could be constructed by aggregating the total income of all
individuals in the SPI, and grossing up using the SPI survey weights. However, an income total based solely on total
income measured in the SPI falls short of total fiscal income for the resident population because it does not capture
fiscal income that is not actually assessed by the tax authority. Relevant income that is not captured by the SPI
includes fiscal income below the personal allowance, as well as fiscal income which is missed as a result of tax evasion.
We augment the internal income total with an estimate of total fiscal income below the personal allowance using
data from the Family Resources Survey (FRS). We use the individual-level income component variables available in
the FRS to construct a fiscal income variable which corresponds to the SPI income definition. The total income of
individuals whose fiscal income is below the standard personal allowance is then estimated using FRS survey weights
and added to the total SPI income of those earning above the personal allowance.
This method of augmenting the internal SPI income control differs somewhat from the approach used by WID
prior to 2009-10. Most importantly, the previous WID method did not systematically add in total income below the
personal allowance (see Appendix C for further details). This omission made little difference to the control total at
the time, as the standard personal allowance was relatively low (around £4,000 in the late 1990s). In recent years,
this issue has become more pressing as the personal allowance has increased, resulting in a growing proportion of
total income below the tax threshold. Our FRS adjustment is thus needed more now than it was in the past, as is
reflected in Figure C1 which illustrates the growing difference this adjustment makes to our total.
While summing incomes using FRS data may capture a significant proportion of total income below the personal
allowance, there is a concern that survey under-coverage and/or under-reporting may result in substantial quantities
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of missing income. One example of this is the known under-reporting of benefit income in the FRS. Corlett et al.
(2018) find a £37 billion gap between total benefit receipts in the FRS/HBAI and what the the government reported
spending. Significant gaps exist particularly for the State Pension (£7.1 billion) and Employment Support Allowance
(£6.2 billion) receipts. Missing benefit income affects the denominator of top income shares, but is unlikely to affect
the numerator, as the vast majority of benefit receipts are concentrated at the bottom of the income distribution.
In 2016-17, total benefit income below the personal allowance, estimated using the FRS, accounted for 88% of total
benefit income using the SPI and FRS combined. The FRS component of the state pension total also represented 37%
of the SPI/FRS combined total, whereas the FRS share of the income total overall was only 8%. As our procedure for
supplementing the SPI control total with FRS income below the personal allowance is likely to suffer from the under-
estimation of benefit income, we use administrative totals for benefit expenditure (including state pension) taken
from the government’s Benefit Expenditure and Caseload Tables. Specifically, we adjust the augmented internal
income total by adding the difference between what the government report spending on taxable benefits, and the
total amount received according to the SPI and FRS combined.
We only adjust benefit types which can be directly compared across data sources. Statutory Sick Pay and
Statutory Maternity Pay, which are observable in the FRS, are not disaggregated from other income components
in the SPI, meaning we cannot compare our total with the expenditure tables. Since entitlement to these benefits
is concentrated among individuals with incomes above the tax threshold, under-reporting is not a major source of
concern. Corlett et al. (2018) do not list SMP/SSP among the benefit types suffering from significant under-reporting
across the FRS as a whole. Meanwhile, Bereavement allowance/Widowed parent’s allowance/Widow’s pension cannot
be directly compared with ‘Bereavement related benefits’ in the expenditure tables, which includes a combination of
taxable and non-taxable benefits. Our final benefits adjustment is therefore only applied to Carer’s Allowance, ESA
(of which contributory), Incapacity Benefit, Jobseeker’s Allowance, and State Pension (excluding State Pension sent
overseas). Overall, this adjustment increases the income total slightly (Figure C1), but by less than 1% in recent
years.
While our top shares account for under-reporting of benefit income, we do not adjust for evasion. Evidence from
representative audits finds that evasion as a share of reported income is higher towards the bottom of the reported
income distribution, both in the UK (Advani et al., 2019; Advani, forthcoming) and US (Johns and Slemrod, 2010;
DeBacker et al., 2020). Recent evidence suggests that offshore tax evasion specifically – the deliberate under-reporting
or hiding of wealth overseas – is highly concentrated among the wealthy (Guyton et al., 2020). It is not clear how
well the latter is picked up in representative audits, so the direction of the net effect on top shares is unclear.
It is not necessary that the personal allowance be used as the threshold for joining the two datasets. An alternative
would be to use a fixed income threshold across all years which exceeds the personal allowance in each year. In
Figure A1, we show that the choice of threshold does make a small difference to the control total: the SPI generally
10
finds more income above the personal allowance than does the FRS, so increasing the joining threshold results in a
lower income total in most years. Our preference for using the personal allowance is based on two factors. First, in
the interest of comparability between the numerator and denominator, it makes sense to use a definition of income for
the denominator which is identical to the numerator for as much of the income distribution as is possible. Second, as
HMRC state, “where income exceeds the [personal allowance], the SPI provides the most comprehensive and accurate
official source of data on personal incomes” (HMRC, 2019).
To construct our post-tax denominator, we calculate the total post-tax (and post-NICs) income accruing to
individuals with fiscal (pre-tax) income in excess of the standard personal allowance from the SPI. We add to this
the total post-NICs income of individuals with pre-tax income below the standard personal allowance from the
FRS. We adjust this sum to account for under-reported benefit income, using the same approach as discussed in
Section 4.1. That is, we add the difference between total government expenditure on taxable benefits (including the
state pension), and gross benefit income reported in our SPI and FRS subsamples, for comparable benefit types. We
do not attempt to deduct tax paid on these benefit receipts in our adjustment. However, as these benefit payments
are concentrated at the bottom of the income distribution, we expect the amount of tax due on this income to be
insignificant relative to our income control total.
4.2 External Control Total: National Accounts
An alternative approach for constructing the income control is to use the National Accounts. The Blue Book tables
for the household sector are published annually, and contain information on the total income of the household sector
disaggregated by income component. In this section, we illustrate how one might construct an external total using
the National Accounts which is as consistent as possible with fiscal income.
We draw primarily on the primary and secondary distribution of income accounts of the household sector (Tables
6.2.3 and 6.2.4S). This differs from the previous WID methodology, which used the combined ‘Households and Non-
Profit Institutions Serving Households (NPISH)’ sectors, as these sectors were not disaggregated until 2017. Details
on how our preferred National Accounts-based methodology relates to the previous WID denominator can be found
in Appendix C. Primary income of the household sector consists of total income from employment (compensation of
employees), self employment income (gross mixed income), imputed rent of owner-occupiers (gross operating surplus),
and property income received (e.g. interest and dividends) net of interest payments. The secondary distribution of
income account contains information on all social contributions and transfers paid and received by the household
sector. We supplement this with information contained in the secondary distribution of income account for General
Government (Table 5.2.4S), which provides a breakdown of government expenditure on social transfers by benefit
type, allowing us to obtain estimates of total expenditure on taxable benefits only.
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The formula used to construct our preferred external fiscal income total is as follows:
Formula 1
Wages and salaries (Table 6.2.3)
+ Gross mixed income (self-employment income) (Table 6.2.3)
+ Interest before FISIM allocation (Table 6.2.3)
+ Dividends (Table 6.2.3)
+ Withdrawals from the income of quasi-corporations (Table 6.2.3)
+ Earnings on property investment (Table 6.2.3)
+ Rent (from natural resources) (Table 6.2.3)
+ Social security pension benefits in cash (Table 6.2.4S)
+ Other social insurance pension benefits (Table 6.2.4S)
+ Incapacity benefit (Table 5.2.4S)
+ Carer’s allowance (Table 5.2.4S)
+ JSA (Table 5.2.4S)
+ Widow’s and Guardian’s allowance (Table 5.2.4S)
+ Statutory sick pay (Table 5.2.4S)
+ Statutory maternity pay (Table 5.2.4S)
+ Unemployment benefit (Table 5.2.4S)
The formula expressed here is ‘constructive’ in the sense that it sums the basic components of income which have
a counterpart in fiscal income. However, the same total can be obtained by summing the aggregate components
‘balance of primary incomes, gross’ and ‘social security benefits, other than transfers in kind’, and then subtracting
the unwanted components. The latter approach is the one formally taken by WID in their previous formula for
constructing the fiscal income denominator (see Appendix C).
While it is possible to make some progress in aligning National Accounts income components with fiscal income,
conceptual differences preclude any attempt to achieve this in full. This is a significant drawback of the National
Accounts approach. For example, the National Accounts concept of income from employment makes various adjust-
ments to employment income as measured in the SPI to account for forms of income not subject to taxation, such
as rent-free dwellings and meal vouchers provided to employees. Moreover, all income components reported in the
National Accounts are subject to a final adjustment during a reconciliation exercise which balances estimates of GDP
obtained using the three different approaches (production, expenditure, and income). Conceptual differences between
the National Accounts and SPI thus plague all categories of income, even if the income source has, in principle, a
counterpart in fiscal income.
4.3 Comparing our denominators
Applying the methods described in the previous two sections, we find that the income total obtained via the aug-
mented internal approach is substantially smaller than the income total obtained using the National Accounts
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(Figure 1). The difference between our external total and our augmented internal total is primarily a level difference;
total income is 15% (£115bn) higher on average over the period using the external measure. However, the two series
follow similar time trends.
Both series diverge from the previous WID income control in recent years (Figure 1). The previous WID denomi-
nator is constructed using an SPI-based approach prior to 2009, and a National Accounts-based approach post-2009.
The pre-2009 WID methodology was based on the total income of the taxpaying population, obtained from tabula-
tions based on the SPI. This was supplemented with an adjustment for the pension income of non-filers, implemented
by scaling up pension income to match the National Accounts total (Atkinson, 2007). The post-2009 WID method-
ology differs from ours in two significant ways. First, we include only the household sector from the outset, excluding
the NPISH sector which had previously been combined with households in the UK National Accounts. In doing so,
we avoid making ex post adjustments of the kind implemented in the previous WID series as a result of this aggre-
gation. Second, we refine our NA-based income control formula to be as closely aligned as possibly with our target
definition of income. The previous WID formula included several income components which have no counterpart
in fiscal income, including a deduction for interest payments made by the household sector and many non-taxable
benefits. In Appendix C, we discuss how to obtain our external income total using the previous WID definition as
the point of departure.
Both our augmented internal and external income controls grow faster than the WID income control post-2009,
with implications for the growth in top shares. The growth rates of our two denominator series are much more
aligned with one another than with the previous WID series, which we find reassuring given the steps we take to
reconcile the National Accounts with the fiscal income definition (see Appendix C).
5 Desireable properties in income share series
To provide a principled approach to selecting between denominator series, we first set out some key properties a
‘good’ top share series should fulfil. We then compare how the SPI/FRS (augmented internal) series and National
Accounts (external) series compare against these metrics.
5.1 Comparability between numerator and denominator
For top income share measures to be meaningful, the definition of income must be consistent between the numerator
and denominator. This is true regardless of which income concept is targeted. If all incomes were reported to a
single authority using a consistent definition, top income shares could be constructed by simply taking the share of
reported income accruing to the richest X% of those individuals. In practice, no such data exist. While administrative
data collected by tax authorities arguably provide the most accurate assessment of fiscal income at the top of the
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distribution, they miss income at the bottom. This is not only an issue in the UK, where individuals with earnings
below the tax exemption threshold (£12,500 in 2020/21) do not generally have a tax record, but also in US studies
which rely on tax return data. Other sources of data on incomes, such as household surveys, suffer from the opposite
problem: poor coverage of income at the top (Burkhauser et al., 2018a,b; Atkinson et al., 2011), and top-coding
(Jenkins et al., 2011). Constructing denominators for top share estimates which are representative of the whole
population therefore requires combining multiple sources of data, reconciling income definitions between these data
sources as far as possible. Larrimore et al. (forthcoming b) show that using administrative ‘information returns’
containing information on the income of non-filers closely replicates survey-based measures of non-filer income in the
US. This supports the use of survey-based measures of non-filer income in the UK, where such administrative data
are unavailable.
5.2 Comparability over time
While comparability between the numerator and denominator ensures that top income shares are meaningful at a
given point in time, much of the value in estimating income inequality comes from observing what happens over time.
There are challenges to interpreting dynamic trends in fiscal income shares as changes in income inequality. First, the
definition of fiscal income changes naturally as the tax code evolves (Burkhauser et al., 2012, 2015; Splinter, 2018).
Variation in which sources of income are included in the tax base may affect the distribution of income assessed for
tax purposes, but not the distribution of income measured according to a more comprehensive definition. This issue
must be borne in mind by users of top share statistics. For our purposes the goal is not to have an accurate measure
of living standards, but to have an accurate measure of the fiscal income series itself, which is then the starting point
from which more welfare-relevant income inequality measures can be produced.
However, this property of fiscal income – that the definition changes over time – creates the following measurement
issue: data sources and methods used to construct top shares must be sufficiently flexible to definitional changes.
This is particularly difficult in light of the fact that top share estimation must draw on multiple sources of data in
order to be representative of the whole population.
Income tax data lends itself naturally to the measurement of top income shares according to a fiscal income
definition; income measured by the tax authorities automatically follows changes in the tax code. However, any
alternative sources of data used to construct the series, such as the National Accounts or survey data, must be
sufficiently disaggregated into specific income components in order to construct a measure of income which is closely
related to the target definition.
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5.3 Comparability across countries
Valuable insight can be gained from comparisons of income inequality across countries and recent work has pushed
the frontiers of inequality measurement with a particular focus on international comparability (Piketty et al., 2018;
Alvaredo et al., 2016; Piketty et al., 2019; Garbinti et al., 2018). The goal of international comparability has driven
the shift towards a National Accounts-based approach to inequality statistics. This was the primary reason for
switching from an SPI-based income control to a National Accounts-based income control in the WID UK fiscal
income series in 2009-10 (Atkinson, 2012).
In the context of the current exercise, an important question to ask is whether or not it is sensible to compare
trends in fiscal income inequality at all? What is included in fiscal income varies across countries as tax codes differ.
For example, the Netherlands includes the imputed rent of owner occupiers in its Income Tax base and therefore
its fiscal income series (Salverda, 2013), whereas the UK does not. Changes in the tax code from one year to
the next could affect the relative trends in inequality across countries even if inequality as measured using a more
comprehensive income definition remains unchanged. Auten and Splinter (2019) document a dramatic change in
fiscal income inequality in the US following the 1986 tax reform which broadened the tax base, and thus the sources
of income reported on tax returns. In the UK, changes in dividend tax rates prompted dividend forestalling responses
which are reflected in the changes in fiscal inequality observed in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis. Comparisons
of such changes in inequality trends across countries must be interpreted with great care.
Fiscal income series can be made comparable across countries to the extent that the methods used to construct
them abide by the same principles. However, comparability of the denominator series alone does not ensure the
international comparability of the series as a whole, as both the numerator and the tax code remain highly country
specific.
5.4 Practical considerations
Developing a top share series which works well in theory is important, but it also needs to work in practice. We
identify two desireable practical criteria. First, the series should be easily maintainable into the future. This means
that any sources of data used to construct the numerator and denominator must be easy to obtain, clean, and
aggregate if the series is to be sustainable. National Accounts fulfil this criteria, yet do not provide the flexibility
for altering income definitions as the tax code evolves. Though survey data are significantly more detailed, they are
potentially more time-consuming to clean and aggregate.
Second, the series would ideally be produced and interpreted using data available at a given point in time, without
requiring any updating of the past. Neither tax nor survey data, once collected and released, are subject to revisions
in general. This means that a fiscal income series which draws only upon these sources of data will be fixed from
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the point of estimation. In contrast, National Accounts figures are subject to frequent revisions, an outcome of the
trade-off between timeliness and accuracy. In the Blue Book, the ONS warn that “expectations of accuracy and
reliability in early estimates are often too high” (Office for National Statistics, 2019). A fiscal income series which
draws on the National Accounts thus ought to, in the interest of accuracy, be updated as previous Blue Book figures
are revised.
5.5 Our Preferred Denominator
We prefer the augmented internal income control total for use in constructing top shares. This approach meets three
of the four criteria set out in the previous subsections.
The data series for the numerator and denominator are largely the same. The SPI provides the most accurate
information on top incomes, hence there is no alternative choice for the numerator. Although the denominator does
include some imputation using the FRS to capture incomes below the personal allowance, an augmented internal total
clearly has the edge over an external total. Not only is using the same data source the best way of ensuring consistency
in the income definition used in the denominator, the SPI also provides “the most comprehensive and accurate official
source of data on personal incomes” above the personal allowance (HMRC, 2019). When supplemented with survey
data which is sufficiently detailed to match tax data definitions, an augmented internal income control provides an
income total for the denominator which is both highly accurate and consistent with the numerator.
An augmented internal total is also preferable from the point of view of comparability over time. The previous
fiscal income series produced by WID used SPI tabulations to construct the denominator prior to the availability
of microdata. The use of similar data sources over time is one requirement for comparability over time. The other
is that the procedure for constructing the fiscal income series must be flexible to changes in the tax code. Again,
the SPI has the advantage over National Accounts here as measurement of income in the SPI automatically evolves
with the tax code. For the UK, the National Accounts are neither sufficiently disaggregated nor is the procedure for
constructing them sufficiently well documented to ensure consistency with tax data definitions. Survey data on the
other hand provide sufficiently detailed information on specific income components to be more flexible to definitional
changes.
The move to a National Accounts-based income total in 2009-10 was primarily motivated by the international
comparability of National Accounts systems (Atkinson, 2012). However, this does not ensure that the series as a
whole is internationally comparable. The data source used to construct the numerator (SPI) is UK-specific, as is
the tax code which defines the income measure used for the numerator. To the extent that fiscal income definitions
differ across countries anyway, it is not obvious that the use of National Accounts for measuring total income offers
a clear improvement.
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In principle, a fiscal income series which uses an SPI-based income control is far easier to maintain than any
other alternative, as the SPI is already relied upon to compute the numerator. One argument commonly put forward
against using the SPI data in general is that the SPI Public Use Tapes are released with a longer time lag relative
to the National Accounts, causing a delay in the availability of policy-relevant statistics. For our purposes, there is
no such disadvantage as the numerator already relies on the release of SPI data. Supplementing the SPI with survey
data to estimate the total income of the non-taxpaying population requires an additional time investment. However,
we argue that this is a necessary burden. In the absence of this step, there is a risk that the income total obtained
from the SPI will continue to diverge from the true income total as the personal allowance increases, giving rise to
a top income share series which is superficially steep. Figure C1 illustrates the growing importance of this step in
recent years. Adding the adjustment for missing benefit incomes using admin data imposes little extra work as these
tabulations are readily available and user-friendly, though in practice this step makes only a small difference to total
income. Both the FRS and government expenditure tabulations are made available well ahead of the SPI Public Use
Tapes, meaning that these adjustments do not come at the expense of timeliness.
Unlike the National Accounts, which are subject to frequent revisions and adjustments, the SPI data are generally
fixed from the time of publication. This means that there is no need to update previous SPI-based estimates and




Figure 2 illustrates how the choice of denominator affects top income shares. The predominant difference is in the
levels: the pre-tax income share of the top 1% is 1-2pp higher using the augmented internal control total than the
external total. This means that by using an income control total which diverges from the fiscal income definition, we
under-state the extent of income inequality in the UK. The choice of denominator also has a small effect the observed
evolution of top income shares over time. Using an augmented internal control total, the income share of the top 1%
rose in the lead up to the Financial Crisis, from 12.2% in 1996-97 to 15.2% in 2007-08, an increase of 25%. This was
followed by a steep decline immediately after the Financial Crisis, though this is likely to reflect income-forestalling
and income-delaying responses to the increase in the top rate of income tax (Seely, 2014; Browne and Phillips, 2017).
Between 2010-11 and 2016-17, the top 1% share rose slightly from 13.5% to 14.1%. Using an external control total
implies a slightly steeper rise in inequality in the late 1990s, but otherwise the two series follow similar trends.
Since 2009-10, our series diverges from the top income share series presented previously in WID (Figure 3), which
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has been used as a benchmark in previous studies (e.g. Burkhauser et al., 2018b). Our results therefore affect our
understanding of what has been happening to UK inequality in recent years. The WID top income shares imply that
in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis, income inequality dropped below levels observed since the beginning of the
21st Century, before rising again from 2013-14 onwards. By contrast, our estimates imply that top shares dropped
less severely, down to levels observed immediately prior to the Financial Crisis in 2005-07.
Top shares have risen in the past two decades, but in relative terms much more so at the very top of the income
distribution. Figure 4 shows that while the share of income earned by the top 10% remained stable between 1996-97
and 2016-17, the top 1% (0.1%) share grew by 16% (32%) over the same period.
6.2 Post-tax shares
Our post-tax series shows the share of income at the top after income tax and National Insurance contributions
are deducted from individual income. Top shares are, unsurprisingly, lower post-tax than prior to redistribution.
Figure 5 shows that the top 1% (0.1%) share fell from 14.1% to 10.7% (5.6% to 4.1%) following the deduction of
individual income taxes in 2016-17.
Since the 1990s, the extent of redistribution appears to have increased. Figure 6 shows the percentage reduction
in top shares following the deduction of income taxes. This illustration highlights the role of tax rates in affecting
redistribution: the income share of the top 1% was reduced by 17% as a result of progressive individual income
taxation in 2009-10. This rose to 22% in 2010-11, coinciding with the increase in the top marginal tax rate from 40%
to 50%. The reduction in top shares following the deduction of individual income taxes fell again slightly in 2013-14
when the 45% top marginal rate was introduced, from 24% to 23% for the top 1%.
7 Conclusion
We outline two approaches one could adopt to construct an income control total for measuring top income shares: an
augmented internal control total based on tax and survey data; and an external control total based on the National
Accounts. These approaches can be judged against four desirability criteria, which we define as (i) comparability
between the numerator and denominator; (ii) comparability over time; (iii) comparability across countries; and (iv)
practical sustainability. We argue that while the external income total serves none of these goals, the augmented
internal income total serves all but the third goal of international comparability. On this basis, we advocate the use
of an augmented internal income control total for constructing a fiscal income series.
Our top share series for the UK based on this augmented internal control total displays a higher level of inequality
and a slightly flatter trend relative to a series based on the previous fiscal income control total (Alvaredo, 2017)
published in the World Inequality Database. Using an updated external control total, the pre-tax fiscal income share
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of the top 1% rose from 10.0% to 12.6% between 1996-97 and 2016-17. In contrast, our augmented internal series
suggests the top 1% share was around 2 percentage points higher over this period, rising from 12.2% to 14.1% over
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8 Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Preferred SPI-based income control, National Accounts-based income control, and WID
Notes: ‘SPI-based pre-tax total’ is constructed by summing individual incomes above the standard personal allowance (based
on the SPI Public Use Tape); individual incomes below the standard personal allowance (based on the FRS); and an adjustment
for under-reported benefit income based on administrative Benefit Expenditure and Caseload tables (as outlined in Section 4.1).
‘NA-based pre-tax total’ is constructed by summing income components in the ‘Households’ sector of the 2019 Blue Book (as
outlined in Section 4.2). ‘Previous WID series’ is the income total published in WID prior to the release of our series.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the SPI, FRS, and Benefit Expenditure and Caseload tables (SPI total); the UK
National Accounts (NA total); and WID (Previous WID series). Underlying data are provided in Table A3.
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Figure 2: Top shares using our SPI-based and NA-based income control totals
(a) Top 10%, 5%, and 1% shares
(b) Top 0.5%, 0.1%, and 0.05% shares
Notes: SPI-based top shares are constructed by dividing aggregate pre-tax income among the top X% (based on the SPI) by
our preferred SPI/FRS pre-tax income total (Section 4.1). NA-based top shares are constructed by dividing aggregate pre-tax
income among the top X% (based on the SPI) by our NA-based income control total (Section 4.2). All top shares are defined
relative to the total number of individuals aged 15 or older in the population living in the UK.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the SPI, FRS and Benefit Expenditure and Caseload Tables (SPI-based shares); and
the UK National Accounts (NA-based shares).
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Figure 3: Top 1% share: ours and the previous WID series
Notes: SPI-based top shares are constructed by dividing aggregate pre-tax income among the top X% (based on the SPI) by
our preferred SPI/FRS pre-tax income total (Section 4.1). All top shares are defined relative to the total number of individuals
aged 15 or older in the population living in the UK. ‘Previous WID series’ is the fiscal income series published in WID prior
to the relase of our series.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the SPI, FRS and Benefit Expenditure and Caseload Tables (SPI-based shares); and
WID (‘Previous WID series’).
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Figure 4: Growth in top shares relative to 1997
Notes: SPI-based top shares are constructed by dividing aggregate pre-tax income among the top X% (based on the SPI)
by our preferred SPI/FRS pre-tax income total (Section 4.1). The series are normalised such that the top share in 1996-97 is
equal to 100. All top shares are defined relative to the total number of individuals aged 15 or older in the population living
in the UK.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the SPI, FRS and Benefit Expenditure and Caseload Tables.
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Figure 5: Top pre- and post-tax income shares
(a) Top 10%, 5%, and 1% shares
(b) Top 0.5%, 0.1%, and 0.05% shares
Notes: Pre-tax shares are constructed by dividing the aggregate pre-tax income of the top X% (based on the SPI) by our
preferred SPI-based income control total. Post-tax shares are constructed by deducting individual Income Tax liabilities and
National Insurance contributions from pre-tax individual income. Individuals are re-ranked on post-tax income to construct
the post-tax numerator. For Income Tax liabilities, we deduct the actual tax liability as recorded in the SPI. For National
Insurance contributions, we calculate individual estimates by applying the relevant NICs schedule in a given year to the
relevant income-source variables in the SPI and FRS.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the SPI, FRS, and Benefit Expenditure and Caseload Tables.
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Figure 6: Percentage reduction in top shares following redistribution
Notes: Constructed by calculating the percentage difference between the post-tax share of the top X% and the pre-tax share
of the top X%. Shares are based on our SPI-based numerator and SPI-based denominator. All top shares are defined relative
to the total number of individuals aged 15 or older in the population living in the UK.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the SPI, FRS, and Benefit Expenditure and Caseload Tables.
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Appendices
A Additional Tables and Figures
Table A1: Population control totals (millions)






















Notes: UK 15+ population taken from the ONS UK 15+
population mid-year estimate.
Source: Office for National Statistics.
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Table A2: Income components included in our NA-based total and WID’s NA-based total
Income component WID (ESA95) WID (ESA10) Our NA-based total
Wages and salaries (excluding employers’ contributions) X X X
Gross operating surplus (inc. imputed rent of owner-
occupiers)
X X
Gross mixed income (self-employment income) X X X
Social security pension benefits in cash X X X
Widows’ and guardians’ allowances X X X
Unemployment benefit X X X
Jobseeker’s allowance (contributory) X X X
Incapacity benefit (includes ESA) X X X
Maternity benefit X X
Statutory sick/maternity pay X X X
Other social insurance pension benefits (including occupa-
tional pensions)
X X X
Other social insurance non-pension benefits not provided
by General Government (including employer-provided non-
pension insurance)
X X
War pensions and allowances X X
Income support X X
Income tax credits and reliefs X X
Child benefit X X
Non-contributory JSA X X
Care allowances X X X
Disability benefits X X
Universal credit X X
Personal Independence Payments X X
Other benefits X X
Interest received before FISIM (actual interest paid by
banks)
X X X
FISIM allocation received (National Accounts concept:
implicit ‘service charge’ paid by households to financial
intermediaries)
X X
Distributed income of corporations (dividends, with-
drawals from the income of quasi-corporations, earnings
on property investment)
X X X
Income attributable to insurance policy holders
Income payable on pension entitlements X
Investment income attributable to collective investment
fund shareholders (dividends, retained earnings)
Rent (on natural resources) X X X
Deductions
Housing benefits (component of ”social benefits other than
transfers in kind”)
X X
Imputed rent (of Household, NPISH, and General Govern-
ment sectors)
X X
Interest (inc. FISIM) paid by households X X
Rent paid by households (on natural resources) X X
Fixed capital consumption X X
Final 10% deduction X
Notes: The formula for ‘WID (ESA95)’ is based on Atkinson (2012). The formula for ‘WID (ESA10)’ is based on Atkinson
and Ooms (2015). Social fund benefits are added rather than subtracted in ‘WID (ESA10)’ as Atkinson and Ooms (2015)
suggest. The formula for ‘Our NA-based total’ is our own derived measure of fiscal income using the Blue Book.
Source: Atkinson (2012); Atkinson and Ooms (2015); Office for National Statistics (2019).
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Table A3: Income control totals (millions)
Tax year NA-based pre-tax SPI-based pre-tax SPI-based post-tax Previous WID series
1996-97 567,464 465,331 366,511 476,479
1997-98 599,142 503,211 399,127 514,729
1998-99 630,392 537,770 423,937 552,598
1999-00 668,018 574,891 455,509 568,467
2000-01 713,800 630,583 496,654 626,305
2001-02 745,270 650,808 514,745 644,550
2002-03 768,489 663,663 525,216 658,785
2003-04 801,155 665,044 521,058 665,214
2004-05 848,346 729,668 570,417 729,666
2005-06 900,018 796,702 619,382 798,792
2006-07 961,284 849,304 658,683 852,000
2007-08 1,014,762 912,836 706,542 906,262
2008-09 1,033,949
2009-10 1,033,108 926,323 727,573 953,933
2010-11 1,048,554 914,663 717,278 983,554
2011-12 1,076,348 951,385 748,247 1,002,550
2012-13 1,113,348 976,471 772,251 1,018,712
2013-14 1,160,730 1,025,186 812,751 1,038,730
2014-15 1,203,970 1,051,531 836,068 1,091,202
2015-16 1,253,224 1,116,354 887,112
2016-17 1,282,528 1,141,179 913,683
Notes: ‘NA-based pre-tax’ is constructed by summing income components in the ‘Households’ sector of
the 2019 Blue Book (as outlined in Section 4.2). ‘SPI-based pre-tax’ is constructed by summing individual
incomes above the standard personal allowance (based on the SPI Public Use Tape); individual incomes
below the standard personal allowance (based on the FRS); and an adjustment for under-reported benefit
income based on administrative Benefit Expenditure and Caseload tables (as outline in Section 4.1). ‘SPI-
based post-tax is constructed as ‘SPI-based pre-tax’ after deducting income tax and National Insurance
contributions. ‘Previous WID series’ is the income total published in WID prior to the release of our series.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the SPI, FRS, and Benefit Expenditure and Caseload tables (SPI
total); the UK National Accounts (NA total); and WID (Previous WID series).
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Table A4: Top shares pre-tax (%), SPI-based series
Top 10% Top 5% Top 1% Top 0.5% Top 0.1% Top 0.05%
1996-97 40.24% 27.49% 12.19% 8.80% 4.22% 2.99%
1997-98 39.83% 27.40% 12.35% 8.92% 4.24% 3.09%
1998-99 40.60% 28.21% 12.90% 9.38% 4.57% 3.36%
1999-00 40.65% 28.33% 13.00% 9.49% 4.68% 3.45%
2000-01 40.54% 28.51% 13.33% 9.82% 4.87% 3.54%
2001-02 40.90% 28.61% 13.18% 9.61% 4.66% 3.34%
2002-03 40.54% 28.23% 12.82% 9.26% 4.39% 3.14%
2003-04 41.11% 28.72% 13.14% 9.52% 4.57% 3.29%
2004-05 40.61% 28.40% 13.22% 9.63% 4.68% 3.40%
2005-06 41.41% 29.40% 14.14% 10.40% 5.15% 3.76%
2006-07 41.84% 29.99% 14.79% 11.00% 5.56% 4.09%
2007-08 41.99% 30.32% 15.22% 11.43% 5.97% 4.45%
2008-09
2009-10 42.39% 30.61% 15.70% 12.03% 6.57% 4.98%
2010-11 40.71% 28.59% 13.47% 9.92% 5.05% 3.75%
2011-12 40.96% 28.90% 13.55% 9.95% 5.03% 3.74%
2012-13 40.48% 28.52% 13.20% 9.63% 4.81% 3.55%
2013-14 41.35% 29.65% 14.56% 10.97% 5.85% 4.42%
2014-15 41.02% 29.35% 14.27% 10.68% 5.60% 4.20%
2015-16 41.32% 29.88% 14.95% 11.38% 6.15% 4.66%
2016-17 40.47% 28.99% 14.11% 10.62% 5.59% 4.21%
Notes: Constructed by dividing aggregate pre-tax income among the top X% (based
on the SPI) by our preferred SPI/FRS pre-tax income total (Section 4.1). Top shares
are defined relative to the total number of individuals aged 15 or older in the population
living in the UK.
Source: UK series: authors’ calculations based on the SPI, FRS and Benefit Expendi-
ture and Caseload Tables (SPI-based shares).
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Table A5: Top shares post-tax (%), SPI-based series
Top 10% Top 5% Top 1% Top 0.5% Top 0.1% Top 0.05%
1996-97 36.52% 24.38% 10.20% 7.25% 3.40% 2.39%
1997-98 36.32% 24.40% 10.42% 7.44% 3.52% 2.58%
1998-99 36.91% 24.96% 10.77% 7.71% 3.69% 2.70%
1999-00 36.90% 24.98% 10.81% 7.77% 3.75% 2.75%
2000-01 36.68% 24.98% 11.05% 8.01% 3.89% 2.81%
2001-02 36.88% 24.96% 10.90% 7.85% 3.75% 2.70%
2002-03 36.53% 24.61% 10.61% 7.57% 3.55% 2.54%
2003-04 37.06% 25.07% 10.91% 7.82% 3.72% 2.69%
2004-05 36.60% 24.76% 10.95% 7.88% 3.78% 2.75%
2005-06 37.35% 25.65% 11.76% 8.57% 4.20% 3.07%
2006-07 37.82% 26.24% 12.41% 9.15% 4.59% 3.36%
2007-08 37.87% 26.45% 12.73% 9.48% 4.90% 3.64%
2008-09
2009-10 38.10% 26.58% 12.99% 9.85% 5.34% 4.05%
2010-11 36.23% 24.35% 10.50% 7.50% 3.66% 2.70%
2011-12 36.02% 24.25% 10.37% 7.40% 3.60% 2.66%
2012-13 35.44% 23.76% 10.01% 7.09% 3.40% 2.50%
2013-14 36.06% 24.64% 11.14% 8.23% 4.30% 3.25%
2014-15 35.77% 24.37% 10.90% 8.01% 4.12% 3.10%
2015-16 35.92% 24.74% 11.43% 8.56% 4.55% 3.45%
2016-17 35.27% 24.00% 10.71% 7.91% 4.11% 3.10%
Notes: Constructed by dividing aggregate post-tax income among the top X% (based
on the SPI) by our preferred SPI/FRS post-tax income total (Section 4.1). Top shares
are defined relative to the total number of individuals aged 15 or older in the population
living in the UK.
Source: UK series: authors’ calculations based on the SPI, FRS and Benefit Expendi-
ture and Caseload Tables (SPI-based shares).
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Figure A1: Percentage difference in SPI-based income total using different joining thresholds (relative
to personal allowance)
Notes: Each income control total is constructed by summing individual incomes above £Y in the SPI; individual incomes
below £Y in the FRS; and an adjustment for under-reported benefit income based on administrative Benefit Expenditure and
Caseload tables (as outline in Section 4.1).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the SPI, FRS, and Benefit Expenditure and Caseload Tables (SPI total).
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B Population Control
B.1 20+ Population Control
Whereas the previous UK fiscal income series included adults aged 15+ in the population control total, the World
Inequality Database now favours a population control which only includes adults aged 20+. We do not present a
series here using this control total. The reason for this is that while we can use external estimates of the total number
of adults aged 20+ to set the number of individuals included in our numerator, the SPI public use tape does not
record age precisely enough for us to identify and exclude younger individuals.
Using a 20+ population control total to determine the size of the numerator population necessarily means including
fewer individuals than when a 15+ population control is used, reducing the magnitude of the numerator. Failing to
exclude younger individuals from the data has two implications. First, it is possible that some 15-19 year olds have
sufficient income to place them in the top 1%, say, using a 20+ population control to define the size of the numerator.
This means that the observed numerator will upward biased, as those who ought to replace these high-earning 15-19
year olds in the numerator have a lower income by construction. Second, the income of these younger individuals
will be included in the denominator, meaning that the denominator is also upward biased (unless all 15-19 year
olds have zero income). In theory, the direction of bias were we to create a series using this method is therefore
unclear. In practice, the income distribution of individuals aged 16-19 in the FRS (who we can observe) suggests
these individuals are concentrated at the bottom of the income distribution: no one in this age category has an
income exceeding £30,000. This suggests that, were we to produce a series using a 20+ population control without
excluding younger individuals from the sample, our top shares would almost certainly be downward biased.
B.2 Internal Population Control
In recent years, population coverage in our combined SPI/FRS sample has improved, and the population total now
corresponds to 97% of the ONS mid-year estimate. In the 1990s and early 2000s, population coverage fell far short
of the ONS total at 89-93%. With incomplete population coverage, the choice of which population control to use
matters for top share estimates. In this section we illustrate how and why population coverage varies over the time
period, discuss the cases under which different population controls may provide more accurate top share estimates,
and show how top shares vary when an internal population control is used.
Which population control yields the most accurate estimate of top income shares depends on how population
under-coverage is distributed across the income distribution. The ONS population control will be provide an accu-
rate estimate of top income shares in the extreme case that all population under-coverage is concentrated among
individuals with zero fiscal income. In this case, the income control is correct despite the population under-coverage
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(we only miss people who have no income), and we observe the incomes of all individuals who actually represent the
top X% of the population. On the other hand, the internal population control will provide an accurate estimate of
top income shares if under-coverage is uniformly distributed across the income distribution. In other cases, it is often
impossible to say which population control provides the most accurate estimate. If we have full coverage of the top
X% of the population, and under-coverage is concentrated lower down the distribution among those with positive
income, then using the ONS population control will overstate top income shares (the numerator will be accurate
while the denominator will be too low), but using an internal population control does not guarantee greater accuracy
in this case (depending on the distributions of income and under-coverage, using an internal population control may
understate top shares). On the other hand, if we have incomplete coverage of the top X% of the population, then
both population controls will yield biased estimates and the direction of bias is ambiguous. Which population control
is most reasonable therefore depends, to some extent, on how population coverage is likely to be distributed across
the income distribution.
Since 2007, population coverage in our combined sample has been at least 95% (Figure B1). Prior to this,
population coverage was lower, at only 89% in 1997. There are a number of potential explanations for this under-
coverage. One is under-coverage of individuals below the personal allowance stemming from some individuals being
outside the scope of the FRS. Those living in institutional settings (care homes, students in halls of residence,
prisoners) are estimated to total 1.2m (Corlett et al., 2018), and are not represented in the FRS. The adult population
in the FRS also excludes 15-year-olds (of whom there were 714,000 in 2019-20). However, where individuals outside
of the scope of the FRS are liable to pay income tax (e.g. on pensions for those in care homes), they will be captured
by the SPI. This means that under-coverage of these groups should only be an issue at the bottom of the income
distribution. This will not affect the accuracy of the ONS population control in capturing the top X% of the income
distribution, and will have only a minor effect on the income control total.
36
Figure B1: SPI/FRS combined population and ONS UK 15+ total
Notes: ‘SPI/FRS population’ sums the total population of individuals with fiscal income above the standard personal
allowance in the SPI, and the total population of individuals with fiscal income below the standard personal allowance in the
FRS.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the SPI and FRS. The ‘UK 15+ population mid-year estimate’ is obtained from the
ONS.
However, it appears that population under-coverage in the earlier years can be at least partly attributed to the
coverage of taxpayers within the SPI. Figure B2 shows that the population coverage of the FRS has remained stable
over time, with the exception of a small increase in 2003 when Northern Ireland joined the sample population (the
number of individuals in Northern Ireland with incomes below the personal allowance was just 494,000 in 2003). The
total number of individuals with earnings above the personal allowance in the SPI was flat in the mid 2000s, despite a
growing UK population. Moreover, within most £5k income ranges between £10,000 and £65,000, the SPI identifies
fewer people than the FRS does between 2002-03 and 2004-05, with population coverage increasing thereafter. Most
of this rise can be attributed to a rise in the coverage of taxpayers, rather than a rise in the coverage of individuals
included in the SPI who ultimately pay no income tax. Why the coverage of taxpayers in the SPI increases in the
early 2000s remains something of a mystery.
It is not clear what the implications of these findings are for our top share estimates. If the under-coverage issue
mainly concerns those on lower or middle incomes, our top shares will be over-estimated. On the other hand, if the
rise in population coverage mainly reflects an increase in the coverage of top earners, it is not possible to sign the bias
of our estimates. In either of these cases, it is not clear that using an internal population control can provide a more
accurate estimate—and this problem is not changed by alternative choice of denominator, which is an independent
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issue. However, we present our top share series using an internal population control (taking X% of the SPI/FRS
combined population total) in Figure B3 for comparison. Using the internal population control, top shares rose
during the 1990s and 2000s relative to top shares using the ONS population control. As population coverage rose, so
too did the number of people included in the top X%, generating a mechanical increase in the aggregate income of
the top X% which offsets the increase in the control total. Since 2008, the choice of population control makes little
difference to top income shares as coverage is high.
Figure B2: Population totals by source
Notes: ‘Total SPI/FRS population’ sums the total population of individuals with fiscal income above the standard personal
allowance in the SPI, and the total population of individuals with fiscal income below the standard personal allowance in the
FRS. ‘FRS only population’ is the total (weighted) population of all individuals covered in the FRS. ‘FRS population below
personal allowance’ is the total (weighted) population of all individuals in the FRS with fiscal income below the personal
allowance. ‘SPI population above personal allowance’ is the total (weighted) population of all individuals in the SPI with
fiscal income above the personal allowance. The latter two series sum to obtain the ‘Total SPI/FRS population’.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the SPI and FRS. The ‘UK 15+ population mid-year estimate’ is obtained from the
ONS.
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Figure B3: SPI-based top shares using alternative population control totals
Notes: Top shares labeled ‘ONS’ are constructed using the ONS UK 15+ mid-year population estimate as the population
control total. Top shares labeled ‘internal’ are constructed using the internal SPI/FRS population total as the population
control.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the SPI, FRS and Benefit Expenditure and Caseload Tables (SPI-based shares).
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C Comparison with WID Fiscal Income Series
Prior to 2009, the income control total used by WID for the UK fiscal income series was based on the income of the
taxpaying population as recorded in the SPI. This was taken from Personal Income Statistics tabulations, which are
based on the SPI, rather than from the microdata. A key difference is that the tabulations omit non-taxpayers with
incomes above the standard personal allowance (whose tax liability is reduced to zero after deductions and reliefs).
We include these individuals in our SPI total, adding 1 million individuals in 2016-17 and increasing aggregate
income above the personal allowance by 1% (£14 billion). The SPI total in WID was supplemented with pension
income captured in the National Accounts which was over and above the pension income total obtained from the
SPI (Atkinson, 2007). No explicit adjustment was made to account for (non-pension) income below the personal
allowance, which made little difference at the time as the personal allowance was so low. As Figure C1 suggests, this
omission made little difference to the income total in the years for which this method was used, but in recent years,
omitting incomes below the personal allowance results in a growing amount of missing income from the control total,
making the need for our FRS adjustment all the more pressing.
Supplementing the internal SPI income total with data from the FRS has the disadvantage of making the pro-
duction of top income share statistics slightly more tedious. However, we argue that Figure C1 provides a compelling
reason for making this effort. In the most recent year, excluding the FRS adjustment would lead us to underestimate
total income by 7.5%, up from 5% in 2010 and 6.6% in 1997. Fortunately, total income below the personal allowance
can be estimated straightforwardly, using FRS variables which have already been cleaned and expressed a weeklyised
format. FRS data is released ahead of the SPI Public Use Tape, so supplementing the SPI total in this way does not
come at the expense of timeliness.
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Figure C1: SPI-based income control totals before and after adjustments
Notes: ‘SPI internal total above personal allowance (before adding incomes below the PA)’ is constructed by summing the
total income (TI) of all individuals with incomes in excess of the standard personal allowance in the SPI. ‘SPI-based control
total before benefits adjustment (after adding income below PA)’ is constructed by adding the total income of individuals with
incomes below the standard personal allowance from the FRS to the SPI internal total. ‘SPI-based control total after benefits
adjustment (and after adding income below PA)’ is constructed by adding an adjustment for under-reported benefit income
equal to the difference between total income in the SPI/FRS combined total and the amount reported in the UK government’s
Benefit Expenditure and Caseload tables.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the SPI, FRS, and Benefit Expenditure and Caseload Tables.
From 2009, the decision was taken to transition to a National Accounts-based approach for the denominator of
the fiscal income series, on the basis that this would offer improved comparability across countries (Atkinson, 2012).
At the time, the two methods yielded almost identical income control totals for 2007-08, and this year was thus seen
as “a good year in which to make the change” (Atkinson, 2012). Figure C2 illustrates the point at which the two
series appear to cross. Originally, the WID income total was based on the pre-2014 system of accounts (ESA95) and
was constructed as follows1:
Balance of primary income, gross
+ social benefits, other than transfers in kind
- social fund benefits2
- redundancy fund benefits
- employers’ actual social contributions
- imputed rent of owner-occupiers
- attributed property income of insurance policy holders
- imputed social contributions (net)
- housing benefits
1This formula is expressed as in the WID technical reports. In Table A2 the WID formulae are expressed “constructively” to illustrate
the sub-components which are retained in the final income control total using this method.
2This is actually subtracted, rather than added as the recent WID technical notes suggest (Atkinson and Ooms, 2015)
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- fixed capital consumption
Figure C2: WID income control and reconstructed WID NA-based income control
Notes: ‘Reconstructed WID (NA)’ is constructed using the most recent WID formula (Alvaredo, 2017) with data from the
‘Households and NPISH’ sector of the 2016 Blue Book. Note that the income totals differ from the actual WID statistics for
2010-2014 as we use the 2016 Blue Book to obtain figures for all previous years, rather than using the earliest Blue Book
available for a given year. ‘Actual WID’ is the income control published in WID prior to the release of our update series.
Source: ‘Reconstructed WID (NA)’: authors’ calculations based on the UK National Accounts. ‘Actual WID’: WID.
The balance of primary income of the Household and NPISH sectors consists of total income from employment
(compensation of employees), self employment income (gross mixed income), imputed rent of owner-occupiers (gross
operating surplus), and property income received (e.g. interest and dividends) net of payments.
In 2014, a new system for constructing the National Accounts (ESA2010) came into force, prompting changes in
the how the income control was constructed. The formula was modified to include “investment income payable on
pension entitlements” (payable into pension funds, rather than directly to households) in the income total (Atkinson
and Ooms, 2015). This income had previously been deducted under the aggregated component “attributed property
income of insurance policy holders”, and was reintroduced on the grounds that this investment income is ultimately
received by households (Atkinson and Ooms, 2015). The revised income total, using the new definition and updated
Blue Book figures, was 10.1% higher in 2009-10, 9.9% higher in 2010-11, and 9.0% higher in 2011-12. The inclusion
of “investment income payable on pension entitlements”, which in 2012 was estimated at £70 billion (around 7-8% of
the control total) explains a significant proportion of this increase. However, ONS publications which accompanied
the revised 2014 Blue Book suggested that there were also revisions to the estimated income of the NPISH sector,
which until recently was combined with the household sector in the National Accounts (ONS, 2014; ONS, 2014).
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Atkinson and Ooms (2015) also note that the upward revision would “call into question the previous choice of 2009
as a link year with the previous method”, and the decision was taken to reduce the ESA2010-based totals by 9.6%
on a provisional basis. The percentage by which the total has been reduced has subsequently increased as more
recent Blue Book figures have implied a larger difference between the revised totals and the earlier totals in the years
following the WID switch (Alvaredo, 2017).
Since 2014, the formula used by WID to construct the National Accounts-based income total is as follows:
Balance of primary incomes, gross
+ social benefits, other than transfers in kind
- social fund benefits3
- redundancy fund benefits
- employers’ actual social contributions
- imputed rent of owner-occupiers
- attributed property income of insurance policy holders
- attributed property income to collective investment fund shareholders
- imputed social contributions (net)
- housing benefits
- fixed capital consumption
Final total is reduced by approximately 10%
There are two key issues with the WID approach which we seek to address. The first is that the current estimates
are based on National Accounts in which the household and NPISH sectors are combined. Ideally, we would exclude
the income of the NPISH sector from our measure of total fiscal income, an issue noted in Atkinson and Ooms (2015).
Since 2017, these sectors have been disaggregated in the National Accounts, and we are now able to construct the
income total using only the household sector from the outset. This being the case, we see no justification for reducing
the income total by 10% as done previously. When we exclude the NPISH sector, the income total obtained is less
than 1% higher than the total obtained using the WID formula, prior to the 10% deduction (see Section C.1). This
has two implications. The first is that the 10% reduction deducts income which is actually attributable to the
household sector, suggesting that the WID method may underestimate total household income. The second is that
including the NPISH sector has an insignificant effect on the income total. This is consistent with Blue Book figures
which suggest that the NPISH sector alone accounts for less than 1% of gross national income each year. Total
income for the NPISH sector only, using the same definition as for the household sector, ranges from £1 billion in
1999 to £3.5 billion in 2017, less than 1% of total income for the household sector.
Our second major departure from the WID methodology addresses the issue of definitional differences. The WID
formula diverges from fiscal income in a number of its components. As noted by Atkinson and Ooms (2015), the
WID formula deducts interest paid by the household sector (on mortgages etc.), and makes a deduction for measured
3This is actually subtracted, rather than added as the recent WID technical notes suggest (Atkinson and Ooms, 2015)
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depreciation (fixed capital consumption). No such deductions are made in fiscal income. The WID formula also
includes the majority of non-taxable benefits, as well as investment income payable on pension entitlements (which
is received by pension funds rather than households directly). Neither have a counterpart in fiscal income. As one of
our stated goals of a good fiscal income series is that the denominator should be as consistent as possible with the
numerator, we take steps to modify the National Accounts-based approach to this end.
Table A2 illustrates the income components which are retained in (i) the original WID formula (based on ESA95);
(ii) the most recent WID formula (based on ESA10); and (iii) our formula as outlined in Section 4.2. It is clear that
the WID formulae are much more comprehensive in terms of the sources of income included, but that these formulae
also involve a number of deductions which have no counterpart in fiscal income. The most significant in magnitude
are the deductions for interest paid by households (which includes mortgage payments), fixed capital consumption,
and imputed rent.
Unlike in the WID definition, we do not include gross operating surplus accrued by the household sector (a
component of the balance of gross primary income). The majority of this component is accounted for by the imputed
rent of owner-occupiers, but actual rental income (from the leasing of dwellings) may also be included here. The
imputed rent of owner occupiers has no place in fiscal income, and in the WID definition a deduction is made
to account for this. The issue with this approach is that the amount deducted for imputed rent comes from the
consumption expenditure tables of the Household, NPISH, and General Government sectors combined, and this
total exceeds the gross operating surplus of the household (and NPISH) sector. This results in an (economically
meaningless) net deduction from total income. While there is an argument for including a small fraction of the
household sector gross operating surplus in the income total to approximate actual rental income (which has a
counterpart in fiscal income), this approximation is likely to be highly inaccurate. In Section C.6 we illustrate the
(small) effect of including a constant fraction of gross operating surplus in our income total. For our main NA-based
fiscal income series, we choose to exclude gross operating surplus from the outset.
The net effect of these differences is that our NA-based income control total is considerably higher than the WID
total (Figure 1). In the subsequent sections, we illustrate how one obtains our NA-based fiscal income total from the
previous WID series step-by-step.
C.1 Step 1: Update WID using up-to-date Blue Book
Using the previous WID methodology, we update the denominator series using the revised 2019 Blue Book estimates,
maintaining the same definitions and procedures as outlined in the latest WID formula above. The revised income
total is higher in each tax year since 2010-2014, ranging from 0% higher than the WID total in 2001-02, to 4.3%
higher in 2013-14 (Figure C3). Revisions to the National Accounts are common, and the ONS note that “expectations
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of accuracy and reliability in early estimates are often too high” (Office for National Statistics, 2019). The WID
methodology does not update previous years’ figures based on revisions to the Blue Book, resulting in an over-
reliance on early estimates. The most substantial contribution to the change in recent years (particularly 2013-15)
is an increase in the balance of gross primary income estimates. To the extent that the revised Blue Book estimates
are of higher quality than earlier estimates, we should be updating the income control total to reflect these revisions.
Figure C3: Reconstructed WID (2016 Blue Book) and updated WID (2019 Blue Book)
Notes: ‘Reconstructed WID (NA)’ is constructed using the most recent WID formula (Alvaredo, 2017) with data from the
‘Households and NPISH’ sector of the 2016 Blue Book. Note that the income totals differ from the actual WID statistics for
2010-2014 as we use the 2016 Blue Book to obtain figures for all previous years, rather than using the earliest Blue Book
available for a given year. ‘Updated WID’ is constructed using the most recent WID formula with data from the ‘Household
and NPISH’ sector of the latest release of the Blue Book (2019).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the UK National Accounts.
C.2 Step 2: Exclude the NPISH sector
Until recently, the Blue Book did not disaggregate the household sector from the NPISH sector. The latter includes
trade unions, universities and further education institutions, religious organisations, charitable organisations, and
political parties. Using disaggregated National Accounts (made available since 2017), we update the WID series
including only the household sector from the outset. In doing so, it is no longer appropriate to apply a 10%
deduction to the income total obtained using the WID formula. The initial motivation for doing this was to offset
the increase in the income total resulting from the adoption of ESA2010, on the basis that this upward revision
was partly a reflection of an increase in income attributed to the NPISH sector (Atkinson and Ooms, 2015). If the
NPISH sector can be excluded from the outset, then there is no argument for reducing the income total in this way.
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We illustrate this change in two steps.
Figure C4a illustrates the income total including the NPISH sector with and without the 10% deduction (otherwise
following the most recent formula used by WID). Figure C4b introduces the total computed by excluding the NPISH
sector, without the 10% deduction. Excluding the NPISH sector and removing the 10% deduction increases the
income total relative to the updated WID series (which includes and reducing the total by 10%). In fact, the
revised income total is higher by just under 11% between 1997 and 2017 on average. The fact that the income
total excluding the NPISH sector exceeds the income total using the combined sector approach implies that the 10%
deduction applied previously was too great: upward revisions to the combined income of the household and NPISH
sectors cannot be attributed to the NPISH sector alone. It is possible that a substantial proportion of the increase
observed by WID following the implementation of ESA2010 can be attributed to inclusion of ‘investment income
payable on pension entitlements’ in the newly updated formula. This component, Atkinson and Ooms (2015) argue,
should be included the income total, as it “has a counterpart in household income”. This added an additional £70
billion to the income total, increasing the total by approximately 7%.
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Figure C4
(a) Updated WID, before and after 10% deduction
(b) Updated WID, excluding NPISH and reversing 10% deduction
Notes: ‘Updated WID (incl. NPISH, with 10% deduction)’ is constructed using the most recent WID formula (Alvaredo,
2017) with data from the ‘Household and NPISH’ sector of the latest release of the Blue Book (2019). ‘Updated WID (incl.
NPISH, without 10% deduction)’ is constructed by removing the 10% deduction from the most recent WID formula, using
data from the ‘Households and NPISH’ sector of the 2019 Blue Book. ‘Updated WID (excl. NPISH, without 10% deduction)’
is constructed using by removing the 10% deduction from the most recent WID formula, and using data from the ‘Households’
sector of the 2019 Blue Book only.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the UK National Accounts.
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C.3 Step 3: Remove non-taxable benefits
The WID methodology does not correspond to a strict definition of fiscal income in that some non-taxable benefits
are included in the total. In order to move closer to a fiscal income series, we remove these non-taxable benefits from
the income total. Doing so reduces the income total relative to our updated WID series (excluding NPISH, without
10% deduction) by 7% on average between 1997 and 2017 (Figure C5).
Figure C5: Updated WID, removing non-taxable benefits
Notes: ‘Updated WID (incl. NPISH, with 10% deduction)’ is constructed using the most recent WID formula (Alvaredo,
2017) with data from the ‘Household and NPISH’ sector of the latest release of the Blue Book (2019). ‘Updated WID (excl.
NPISH, without 10% deduction)’ is constructed using by removing the 10% deduction from the most recent WID formula,
and using data from the ‘Households’ sector of the 2019 Blue Book only. ‘Remove non-taxable benefits (excl. NPISH, without
10% deduction)’ is constructed by removing non-taxable benefits (see Table A2 for full list) from the series ‘Updated WID
(excl. NPISH, without 10% deduction)’ .
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the UK National Accounts.
C.4 Step 4: Deduct pension fund income, modify the interest concept, and reintro-
duce interest payments
We reverse the decision to include ‘investment income payable on pension entitlements’ in the income total, which is
paid to pension funds, rather than directly to households. This has no counterpart in fiscal income. Deducting this
component reduces our previous total, but by a rate which is decreasing over time, ranging from a 10% reduction in
all years prior to 1998 to a 5% reduction in 2017-18 (Figure C6).
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Figure C6: Updated WID, removing non-taxable benefits and pension entitlements
Notes: ‘Updated WID (incl. NPISH, with 10% deduction)’ is constructed using the most recent WID formula (Alvaredo,
2017) with data from the ‘Household and NPISH’ sector of the latest release of the Blue Book (2019). ‘Remove non-taxable
benefits (excl. NPISH, without 10% deduction)’ is constructed by removing non-taxable benefits (see Table A2 for full list)
from the series ‘Updated WID (excl. NPISH, without 10% deduction)’ (Figure C5). ‘Remove non-taxable benefits and pension
entitlements (excl. NPISH, without 10% deduction)’ is constructed by deducting income attributable to pension entitlements
from the series ‘Remove non-taxable benefits (excl. NPISH, without 10% deduction)’.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the UK National Accounts.
There are two changes which we make to better align the interest total included in the WID definition with the
fiscal income concept of interest. The first concerns the conceptual difference between interest as paid by financial
institutions (and counted as fiscal income), and the National Accounts concept of interest. In the National Accounts,
interest is decomposed into the actual interest paid on loans and deposits, and an implicit ‘service charge’, known as
FISIM, paid by depositors and borrowers to financial institutions for their services as an intermediary. The National
Accounts ‘interest’ received by households who hold deposits in bank accounts is the estimated (fictional) interest
that households would receive before the implicit charge for financial services is deducted. Thus, what is termed
‘interest’ in the National Accounts is the sum of bank interest (‘interest before FISIM allocation’) and FISIM. Only
the first component has a counterpart in fiscal income, yet the WID fiscal income series uses the National Accounts
concept of interest (which is higher).
The National Accounts concept of interest is not explicitly added in the WID definition, but is included implicitly
as part of the balance of gross primary income component. Therein lies another conceptual difference which departs
from the fiscal income concept of interest: the balance of gross primary income includes net interest, i.e. interest
received by households minus interest paid on loans (including mortgages). As no tax deduction is made for interest
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payments, we do not want to deduct these from total income.4 Amending the concept of interest included in the NA-
based income total results in the first significant change in the trend of the National Accounts-based total (Figure C7),
driven by the switch from net interest to all interest received by households. Interest receipts (and payments) rose
significantly in the lead up to the financial crisis, and fell afterwards. The result is a National Accounts-based income
total whose trend corresponds more closely to the SPI-based income total series. This is a reassuring sign that we
are approaching an income measure more closely aligned with the definition of fiscal income.
Figure C7: Updated WID, removing non-taxable benefits and pension entitlements, adding interest
paid
Notes: ‘Updated WID (incl. NPISH, with 10% deduction)’ is constructed using the most recent WID formula (Alvaredo, 2017)
with data from the ‘Household and NPISH’ sector of the latest release of the Blue Book (2019). ‘Remove non-taxable benefits
and pension entitlements (excl. NPISH, without 10% deduction)’ is constructed by deducting income attributable to pension
entitlements from the series ‘Remove non-taxable benefits (excl. NPISH, without 10% deduction)’ (fig C6). ‘Remove non-
taxable benefits, pension entitlements; add interest paid (excl. NPISH, without 10% deduction)’ is constructed by reversing
the deduction of interest and rent on natural resources paid by households (i.e. adding these payments back in) to the series
‘Remove non-taxable benefits and pension entitlements (excl. NPISH, without 10% deduction)’. In addition, the concept of
interest received by households is changed from the National Accounts concept (including FISIM) to the fiscal income concept
(excluding FISIM).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the UK National Accounts.
C.5 Step 5: Addressing other conceptual differences (adding fixed capital consump-
tion and excluding gross operating surplus)
National income as defined in the National Accounts represents the total income received after the deduction of
fixed capital consumption. The WID formula adopts this convention, deducting the fixed capital consumption of the
4Rent paid on natural resources is also deducted from the WID income total in a similar way, though this component is very small in
magnitude. We add this back in just as we add interest paid by households, but do not separately show its effect here.
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household sector from the income total. No such deduction is taken into account in the calculation of fiscal income,
and so we reverse the deduction of this component from the National Accounts total. Fixed capital consumption
trends upwards over time, so reversing its deduction increases the slope of the National Accounts-based income total
(Figure C8).
Figure C8: Updated WID, removing non-taxable benefits and pension entitlements, adding interest
paid and fixed capital consumption
Notes: ‘Updated WID (incl. NPISH, with 10% deduction)’ is constructed using the most recent WID formula (Alvaredo,
2017) with data from the ‘Household and NPISH’ sector of the latest release of the Blue Book (2019). ‘Remove non-taxable
benefits, pension entitlements; add interest paid (excl. NPISH, without 10% deduction)’ is constructed by reversing the
deduction of interest and rent on natural resources paid by households (i.e. adding these payments back in) to the series
‘Remove non-taxable benefits and pension entitlements (excl. NPISH, without 10% deduction)’. In addition, the concept of
interest received by households is changed from the National Accounts concept (including FISIM) to the fiscal income concept
(excluding FISIM) (as in fig C7). ‘Remove non-taxable benefits, pension entitlements; add all property income changes,
fixed capital consumption (excl. NPISH, without 10% deduction)’ is constructed by reversing the deduction of fixed capital
consumption from the series ‘Remove non-taxable benefits, pension entitlements; add interest paid (excl. NPISH, without
10% deduction)’.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the UK National Accounts.
Finally, the WID income total includes the gross operating surplus of the household (and NPISH) sector, which
is a subcomponent of the balance of gross primary income and includes the imputed rent of owner-occupiers, later
deducting a total for imputed rentals (these have no counterpart in fiscal income). The issue with this approach is that
while gross operating surplus includes the imputed rentals of owner occupiers, the imputed rent total which is then
deducted is obtained from the final consumption expenditure table of the Household, NPISH and General Government
sectors combined. This expenditure total exceeds the value of gross operating surplus accruing to households, meaning
that the addition of (gross operating surplus - imputed rent) results in an economically meaningless net deduction
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from total income. In Section C.6, we discuss alternative approaches to addressing this issue. For our main series,
we exclude gross operating surplus from the outset (and remove the deduction for imputed rent). Removing the
meaningless deduction arising from the inclusion of (gross operating surplus - imputed rent) increases the income
total by 2.7% on average (Figure C9).
Figure C9 illustrates how our as-close-to-fiscal-as-possible National Accounts total (black line) compares to what
the income total would look like using the latest WID methodology with the current Blue Book (dashed grey line).
The trend in total income is flatter using the WID methodology, implying a steeper rise in income inequality than
we observe using our alternative National Accounts income total.
Figure C9: Updated WID, removing non-taxable benefits, pension entitlements and gross operating
surplus, adding interest paid, fixed capital consumption, and imputed rent
Notes: ‘Updated WID (incl. NPISH, with 10% deduction)’ is constructed using the most recent WID formula (Alvaredo, 2017)
with data from the ‘Household and NPISH’ sector of the latest release of the Blue Book (2019). ‘Remove non-taxable benefits,
pension entitlements; add interest paid, fixed capital consumption (excl. NPISH, without 10% deduction)’ is constructed
by reversing the deduction of fixed capital consumption from the series ‘Remove non-taxable benefits, pension entitlements;
add interest paid (excl. NPISH, without 10% deduction)’ (fig C8). ‘Remove non-taxable benefits, pension entitlements,
gross operating surplus; add interest paid, fixed capital consumption, imputed rent (excl. NPISH, without 10%deduction)’ is
constructed by removing gross operating surplus and reversing the deduction for imputed rent from the series ‘Remove non-
taxable benefits, pension entitlements; add interest paid, fixed capital consumption (excl. NPISH, without 10% deduction)’,
resulting in our final NA-based income control series which is equivalent to ‘NA-based pre-tax total’ in Figure 1.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the UK National Accounts.
C.6 Alternative approaches to including rental income in the NA-based income total
The WID total includes gross operating surplus accrued by the household (and NPISH) sector, and deducts a total for
imputed rent which does not correspond to the imputed rent of owner-occupiers included in gross operating surplus.
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In our main NA-based income series, we exclude gross operating surplus from the outset. However, there may be a
case for including some (small) fraction of gross operating surplus. Whether or not this desirable depends on what
else is included in this component. Some sources suggest that gross operating surplus is made up of both the imputed
rentals of owner-occupiers, as well as rental income from the leasing of dwellings (see data tables accompanying ONS
(2015)), while others suggest that gross operating surplus includes imputed rentals only, with actual rentals included
in mixed income (ONS, 2019)5. Ideally, if gross operating surplus were to include actual rental income, this would
be included in our fiscal income total. However, the National Accounts do not disaggregate gross operating surplus,
meaning that we cannot directly add its subcomponents. We consider two approaches to this issue:
1. Exclude gross operating surplus from the outset (and make no deduction for imputed rent) - our preferred
approach
2. Add a constant fraction of gross operating surplus to total income, informed by the breakdown of Gross
Operating Surplus provided in the data tables accompanying ONS (2015) for the years 2008, 2012 and 2013.
The first approach would make sense if gross operating surplus included the imputed rent of owner-occupiers only.
On the other hand, were actual rental income to be included in gross operating surplus, then including a constant
fraction of gross operating surplus to approximate actual rental income may be preferable. The desirability of the
second approach will also depend on whether estimated property incomes obtained by taking a constant fraction
of gross operating surplus look similar in levels and trends to property income estimates derived from other data
sources (including the SPI). If estimated property incomes using the constant fraction approach follow very different
trends from direct estimates of property income, then this approach could result in a significant amount of noise,
and following approach (1) may be the safer option. ONS (2015) provide a breakdown of gross operating surplus
into ‘owner occupied dwellings’ and ‘leasing of dwellings’ for the years 2008, 2012 and 2013 (based on the 2015 Blue
Book). The proportion of gross operating surplus accounted for by ‘leasing of dwellings’ in each year is 5.7%, 5.7%
and 6.4% respectively. As an approximation to income from the rental of property, we take 6% of the gross operating
surplus in each year, and add this to the income total (Approach 2). Figure C10 shows that the choice of approach




Figure C10: NA-based fiscal income total using alternative approaches to rental income
Notes: ‘Approach 1’ is constructed using our preferred NA-based income control formula (Section 4.2) using data from the
2019 Blue Book. ‘Approach 2’ is constructed by adding 6% of the value of ‘gross operating surplus’ to our preferred NA-based
income control total.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the UK National Accounts
Our main NA-based series uses the first approach. In part, this is is because evidence suggests that taking a
constant fraction of gross operating surplus may at best give a very noisy approximation to income from the rental
of property. Figure C11 plots property income derived from the SPI alongside our NA-based approximation. The
two series produce similar totals in the mid 2000s, but follow very different trends. Our NA-based approximation
appears to miss a growing proportion of property income relative to the SPI total in recent years. The issue of properly
accounting for property income exemplifies the difficulties in constructing an income total from the National Accounts
which corresponds closely to fiscal income.
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Figure C11: Income from property based on (i) the SPI and (ii) our NA approximation
Notes: ‘SPI income from property’ plots the total value of income from property assessable for Income Tax, based on data
from the SPI Public Use Tape (using the variable ‘INCPROP’). ‘NA income from property (6% of gross operating surplus)’
is based on the value of gross operating surplus obtained from the ‘Households’ sector of the 2019 Blue Book.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the UK National Accounts and SPI Public Use Tapes.
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